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YEATTS v. MURRAY
249 Va. 285, 455 S.E.2d 18 (1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
In 1991, Ronald Dale Yeatts was convicted of capital murder and
robbery and sentenced to death. 1 The Supreme Court of Virginia af-
firmed his conviction and sentence,2 and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 3 Yeatts filed apetition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the State circuit court. Yeatts alleged, among other claims, that his trial
counsel were ineffective. 4 The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss
Yeatts' petition and supported its motion with sworn affidavits submitted
by Yeatts' trial counsel. These affidavits contained explanations for
certain actions taken at trial. Yeatts filed a motion either to strike the
affidavits of his trial counsel or to permit him to take discovery deposi-
tions of the affiants.
5
The circuit court dismissed Yeatts' habeas petition, holding that all
of "Yeatts' claims, except for his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, were eitherprocedurally defaulted or had been presented at trial
and on direct appeal and, were therefore not cognizable. ' ' 6 The circuit
court then held that "Yeatts' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
[did] not meet the standards established by the [United States] Supreme
Court in Strickland v. Washington.
' 7
Yeatts appealed. The Supreme Court of Virginia awarded Yeatts an
appeal limited to two issues: "whetherthe [circuit] court erred by denying
Yeatts' motion to strike the affidavits or [permit him] discovery; and
whether the [circuit] court erred by dismissing Yeatts' petition for writ
of habeas corpus without ordering an evidentiary hearing on his allega-
tions of ineffective assistance of counsel."
8
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that Virginia law permits a
habeas court to consider affidavits as substantive evidence when decid-
ing a motion to dismiss.9 The court also held that a habeas petitioner is
not entitled to conduct discovery depositions as a matter of right.10
Finally, the court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
failing to grant an evidentiary hearing with respect to the defendant's
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. 11
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Use of Affidavits in a Habeas Proceeding
Yeatts contended that the circuit court lacked the authority to
consider affidavits in support of a motion to dismiss a habeas petition.
The Commonwealth, however, argued that Virginia Code section 8.01-
1 Yeatts v. Murray, 249 Va. 285,286,455 S.E.2d 18, 19 (1995).
2 Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121,410 S.E.2d 254 (1991).
3 Yeatts v. Virginia, 503 U.S. 946 (1992).
4 Yeatts v. Murray, 249 Va. at 287, 455 S.E.2d at 19. (From the
wording of the opinion, it appears that Yeatts had two lawyers at trial.)
5 Id. at 287, 455 S.E.2d at 20.
6 Id.
7 Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 288, 455 S.E.2d at 20.
t0 Id. at 289, 455 S.E.2d at 21.
660 permits a habeas court to consider affidavits when deciding a motion
tQ dismiss. The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed, holding that the
unambiguous language of Virginia Code section 8.01-660 permits a
habeas court to consider the affidavit of any witness as substantive
evidence.
12
Capital defense attorneys should note the possible advantages of
using affidavits to support habeas corpus petitions. Affidavits may prove
to be more efficient than evidentiary hearings and thus may help the
habeas petitioner to stay within the shorter time constraints of the new
Virginia habeas corpus system. The use of affidavits in support of habeas
corpus petitions may also provide an effective means to expand the
record and to elaborate on the errors alleged by the petitioner, thus
increasing the chances of being granted an evidentiary hearing.
However, capital defense attorneys also should note that the Yeatts
court held that a habeas petitioner is not entitled to conduct discovery
depositions as a matter of right. 13 Virginia Supreme Court Rule 4:1(b) (5)
states in relevant part, "[N]o discovery shall be allowed in any proceed-
ing for a writ of habeas corpus ... without-prior leave of the court, which
may deny or limit discovery in any such proceeding." 14 The court stated
that this rule gives the habeas court discretion to grant or deny discovery.
In Yeatts the court found nothing in the record which suggested that the
circuit court abused that discretion.
15
H. Default for Failing to Include Claims in the Assignments of
Error
The Supreme Court of Virginia refused to consider Yeatts' final
claim that the circuit court in fact erred in finding that his trial counsel
were not ineffective. Although Yeatts had devoted a substantial portion
of his brief to this argument, the Supreme Court of Virginia seized upon
the literal wording of the Assignment of Errors section in Yeatts' brief to
hold that the claim had not been the subject of an assignment of error.
16
Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:17(c) states in relevant part:
Under a separate heading entitled "Assignments of Error,"
the petition shall list the specific errors in the rulings below
upon which the appellant intends to rely. Only errors assigned
in the petition for appeal will be noticed by this Court.
The Yeatts court explained that "the purpose of assignments of error is to
point out the errors with reasonable certainty in order to direct the court
and opposing counsel to the points on which the appellant intends to ask
a reversal of thejudgment, and to limit discussion to these points." 17 The
court stated that "without such assignments, [the] appellee would be
11 Id. at 290,455 S.E.2d at 21.
12 Id. at 288, 455 S.E.2d at 20. Virginia Code section 8.01-660
states: "In the discretion of the court or judge before whom the petitioner
is brought, the affidavits of witnesses taken by eitherparty, on reasonable
notice to the other, may be read as evidence." Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-660
(1977).
13 Id. at 289, 455 S.E.2d at 21.
14 Id. (quoting Va. Sup. Ct. R. 4:1(b)(5)).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 290-91,455 S.E.2d at 21-22.
17 Id. (citing Harlow v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 269,271-72,77
S.E.2d 851, 853 (1953)).
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unable to prepare an effective brief in opposition .... to determine the
material portions of the record to designate for printing, [sic] to assure
[themselves] of the correctness of the record while it is in the clerk's
office.... "18
As to Yeatts' assignment of error for ineffective assistance of
counsel, the court emphasizedthat the assignment of error merely stated
that the circuit court erred by dismissing the petition "'without ordering
an evidentiary hearing as to his allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel."' 19 The court determined that "[t]his assignment of error only
challenge[d] the alleged procedural failure to order an evidentiary
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 291,455 S.E.2d at 22 (emphasis added).
21 Id. at 290, 455 S.E.2d at 21.
hearing; it [did] not challenge, with reasonable certainty, the habeas
court's substantive ruling on the merits of the ineffective assistance
claims."
20
The draconian approach of the Supreme Court of Virginia is well
worth noting for counsel writing assignments of error. Yeatts had
"devote[d] a substantial portion of his brief to [the] argument" that the
circuit court had erred in finding that his trial counsel were not ineffec-
tive.2 1 As apractical matter, this would appear to identify with more than
sufficient specificity the error committed by the trial court to enable the
Commonwealth to determine the material portions of the record, to
assure itself of the correctness of the record while it was in the clerk's
office, and to prepare an effective brief in opposition. In light of this
ruling, it is critical that habeas petitioners clearly and specifically include
in their Assignments of Error section of the brief every claim which they
intend to argue.
Summary and analysis by:
Douglas S. Collica
CHANDLER v. COMMONWEALTH
249 Va. 270, 455 S.E.2d 219 (1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On the evening of February 7, 1993, Lance A. Chandler, along
with two of his friends, walked into a convenience store with the
intent to steal beer and money.1 The two friends walked to the back
of the store for the beer. Chandler went to the cashier, pointed a gun
at him, and demanded money. When the cashier did not immediately
respond, Chandler closed his eyes, pulled the trigger, and said,
"boom, boom." Chandler then pulled the trigger a second time and
a bullet entered the cashier's head, killing him.2 Chandler was
charged with capital murder, use of a firearm in the commission of
a capital murder, robbery, use of a firearm in the commission of a
robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery.
3
1 Chandler v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 270,274,455 S.E.2d 219,
222 (1995).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 273, 455 S.E.2d at 221.
4 1d.
5 Id. at 281,455 S.E.2d 226, 227.
6 Id, at 273, 284, 455 S.E.2d at 221,228. The Court rejected some
of the defendant's assignments of error in brief, conclusive language.
Others did not involve death penalty law. On still others, the rulings
provide little, if any, guidance because they apply broad, settled prin-
ciples of law to facts that are specific to the case being reviewed. Issues
in these categories that will not be addressed in this summary include: (1)
claims that the Virginia death penalty statute is unconstitutional on
grounds that it violates the Eighth Amendment; it does not provide for
adequate consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the
term "future dangerousness" is unconstitutionally vague; it does not
require a trial judge to reduce death sentence on a showing of "good
cause;" it allows consideration of hearsay evidence during the sentencing
phase; and it does not provide formeaningful appellate review. (Chandler's
attorney should be commended, however, for raising and preserving
these constitutional claims); (2) claim that the prosecution used its
peremptory strikes to remove a disproportionate number of African-
In the first stage of the bifurcated trial, ajury convicted Chandler of
all of the charged crimes.4 At the penalty stage of the trial, Chandler
refused to allow his attorney to present mitigating evidence. The jury
then fixed Chandler's penalty at death based on future dangerousness. At
the sentencing hearing, Chandler decided to offer mitigating evidence to
the trial judge. Chandler then moved to have the jury sentence set aside,
but the trial judge denied the motion.
5
HOLDING
Under Virginia Code sections 17-110.1(A) and 17-110.1(F), the
Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the automatic review of
Chandler's death sentence with his other appeals. The court then upheld
the convictions and death sentence.
6
Americans in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); and
(3) claim that the trial judge should not have allowed a hearsay admission
against interest. Note, however, that this final claim was not federalized,
and therefore federal review of the issue is now precluded. Every hearsay
claim must also be characterized as a violation of the confrontation clause
of the Sixth Amendment. For an example of proper federalization of a
hearsay claim see Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
There was also a claim based on Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S.
Ct. 2187 (1994) (regarding admission of parole ineligibility evidence)
which was found to have been defaulted for failure to raise at the proper
time. The jury asked for the meaning of a life sentence, but the judge
refused to instruct them on parole law. No objection was made until the
post-sentencing hearing. Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
the claim was defaulted for failure to make a contemporaneous objection
under Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:25.
The opinion does not reflect whether the United States Supreme
Court decision in Simmons, requiring that juries be instructed on parole
ineligibility, occurred between the trial and sentencing hearing under Va.
Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Virginia's
finding that the claim was defaulted serves no legitimate state interest.
The purpose of a contemporaneous objection rule is to give trial courts
the opportunity to make a correct ruling, eliminating the cost and
